Can our traditional intuitions about morality and responsibility survive in the face of knowledge gained through modern neuroscience? That's an open question right now because there is still a lot we have to learn, but what we've learned so far may have far-reaching consequences for how we assign moral responsibility.
Some of this may be good in that we develop a better understanding of how our brains work, but some of this may be quite bad.
Martha J. Farah writes in New Scientist, October 9, 2010:
Recent research has shown that psychopaths, who behave antisocially and without remorse, differ from the rest of us in several brain regions associated with self·control and moral cognition (Behavioral Sciences and the Law, vol 16. p 7). Even psychologically normal people who merely score higher in psychopathic traits show distinctive differences in their patterns of brain activation when contemplating moral decisioos Molecular Psychiatry, vol 14. p 5).
The idea that moral behaviour is dependent on brain function presents a challenge to our usual ways of thinking about moral responsibility. A remorseless murderer is unlikely to win much sympathy. But show us that his cold-blooded cruelty is a neuropsychological impairment and we are apt to hold him less respoosible for hls actions.
Presumably for this reason. fMRI evidence was introduced by the defence in a recent murder trial to show that the perpetrator had differences in various brain regions which they argued reduced his culpability. Indeed, neuroscientific evidence has been found to exert a powerful influence over decisions by judges and juries to find defendants "not guilty by reason of insanity" (Behovioral Sciences ond the Law, vol 16. p 85).
The idea that moral behavior depends on brain function shouldn't be the least bit surprising or troubling. After all, what else would it depend on if not the functioning of our brain -- our livers? Our kidneys? The problems we have to face isn't whether moral behavior depends on our brains but to what degree moral behavior depends on our conscious choices -- and thus the degree to which we can or should be held morally culpable for that behavior.
One of the most basic principles of our laws and moral reasoning is that the degree to which a person can be held morally responsible and culpable is dependent upon the degree to which they have conscious control over that behavior. A person who can't choose to act differently is not treated as being as responsible as someone who has a choice and deliberately decides to go with a particular option.
This doesn't necessarily help everyone's defense, though. If it can be shown that violent or criminal behavior stems from a neurological impairment beyond your control, then you shouldn't be punished in the same way but you will have to be held in custody to protect others. After all, if you can't help your violent behavior, you can't be trusted to keep a promise to behave better. As a practical matter, locking a person up to punish them and locking a person up to protect others don't look too different.
What about our own actions? Might an awareness of the neural causes of behaviour influence our own behaviour? Perhaps so. In a 2OO8 study, researchers asked subjects to read a passage on the incompatibility of free will and neuroscience from Francis Crick's book The Astonishlng Hypothesis (Simon and Schuster, 1995).
This included the statement, "You, your joys, and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules."
The researchers found that these people were then more likely to cheat on a computerised test than those who had read an unrelated passage.
This is potentially a real problem. One of the primary arguments offered by creationists is that if people are taught that they evolve from animals, then they won't have any reason to behave morally. The above isn't quite empirical support for that argument, but it comes a bit too close for comfort.
It wouldn't be a good thing for people to start behaving immorally simply because of their understanding of the material and biological basis for their behavior. That would not, however, be a good reason to deny the science behind all this. Instead it means that we'd have to find some way counter such reactions -- and we'd better find ways to do it before people's behavior changes too much.
No comments:
Post a Comment